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Jury Trial Outcomes for Medical Malpractice Cases Involving Pulmonary Embolism
By Frank Griffin, M.D., J.D.*
Insight into jury trial outcomes in complex medical malpractice cases is valuable for
advising clients, making settlement decisions, and evaluating medical malpractice policy.
Pulmonary embolism (“PE”)— basically a blood clot blocking an artery in the lungs—is a
complex, sometimes controversial, and often fatal medical problem that frequently leads to
potential allegations of medical malpractice. PE is the third most common cause of
cardiovascular death in the United States, behind heart attack and stroke.1 Specifically, between
60,000 and 200,000 Americans die annually from PE2 resulting in up to 22,000 to 74,000
prospective medical malpractice claims.3 Therefore, it is not surprising that a Google search
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1
Office of the Surgeon General, The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent Deep Vein
Thrombosis and Pulmonary Embolism (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44178/.
A. Torbicki et al, TASK FORCE FOR THE DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT OF ACUTE
PULMONARY EMBOLISM OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF CARDIOLOGY, Guidelines
on the diagnosis and management of acute pulmonary embolism, 29(18) EUR. HEART J. 22762315 (2008).
2
The exact number of PE-related deaths annually in the United States is uncertain and likely
underestimated. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (hereinafter “CDC”), Venous
Thromboembolism: Data and Statistics, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/dvt/data.html (noting that
“(e)stimates suggest that 60,000 to 100,000 Americans die of DVT/PE” annually); S.B. Smith et.
al., Early Anticoagulation is associated with Reduced Mortality for Acute Pulmonary Embolism,
137(6) Chest 1382 (2010) (noting that pulmonary embolism “account(s) for 50,000 to 200,000
deaths annually”). See also A.J. Burge et. al., Increased diagnosis of pulmonary embolism
without a corresponding decline in mortality during the CT era, 63(4) CLIN. RADIOL. 381
(2008); C. Becattini and G. Agnelli, Acute pulmonary embolism: Risk stratification in the
emergency department, 2(2) INTERN. EMERG. MED. 119 (2007); The Task Force for the
Diagnosis and Management of Acute Pulmonary Embolism of the European Society of
Cardiology, Guidelines on the diagnosis and management of acute pulmonary embolism, 29(18)
EUR. HEART J. 2276 (2008).
3
F. Matsen et al., Lessons Regarding the Safety of Orthopaedic Patient Care An Analysis of
Four Hundred and Sixty-Four Closed Malpractice Claims, 95A(4) J. BONE JOINT SURG. AM. e20
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using the term “Pulmonary Embolism Lawyer” yields thousands of results.4 This study
examines how juries assign blame in medical malpractice cases where PE is the primary
diagnosis at issue.
II. Methods/Procedure
Medical malpractice jury trials involving plaintiffs (or plaintiffs’ decedents) whose
primary diagnosis was PE were sought for analysis. A Westlaw™ search using the search term
“pulmonary embol!,” the connector “and,” and the search term “malpractice” was conducted on
June 22, 2014. The search yielded a total of 722 “cases,” including 571 state court “cases” and
151 federal court “cases.” The opinions for these 722 “cases” were filtered by the author for
cases that went to a jury and that involved patients with PE as the primary diagnosis supporting
the litigation. Summary judgments, bench trials, interlocutory orders, and any other non-jury
trial “cases” were excluded. In addition, cases where pulmonary embolus was not the primary
reason for litigation were excluded. Seventy-one cases5 involving 79 doctors in 27 states
qualified for the study. For each case, a data sheet was generated by the author by reviewing the
facts given in the judicial opinion.6 The data was then compiled into a table and analyzed.7

(2) (2013) (reporting 3.7 malpractice claims per 10 adverse events, and applying here by
considering 60,000 to 200,000 pulmonary embolisms as “adverse events”).
4
Specifically, one hundred and sixty-four thousand (164,000) results were reported with the
Google search (Search conducted on 8/23/16).
5
See Appendix A for a list of the cases (noting that one case, Hall v. Frankel, 190 P.3d 852
(2008), was counted as two separate cases because the jury found for one doctor (the
pulmonologist) and against the other doctor (the orthopedist) in the same case).
6
See Appendix B1 and B2.
7
See Appendix A.
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III. Results
A. Overview of the Data
In ninety-three percent (66/71) of the cases, the patient who was the subject of the lawsuit
died of the PE. In the five nonfatal cases, two involved cardiac arrests related to PE, and three
were based on the PE alone. Seventy of the 71 cases were appealed. Seventy-nine percent
(56/71) of the cases included in this study were reported, while twenty-one percent (15/71) were
published by Westlaw™ but not reported.8
B. Outcome of the Trial by Jury and Appeal
Defendants won sixty-nine percent (49/71), and plaintiffs won thirty-one percent (22/71)
of the cases. On appeal, 31% (22/71) were reversed with the rate of reversal similar for plaintiff
verdicts (7/22; 31.8%) and defense verdicts (15/49; 30.6%). In 2016 dollars,9 jury awards in
favor of the plaintiff ranged from $156,196 to $20,241,695 with a median of $1,048,114 and a
mean of $2,458,575 for the twenty cases in which the verdict amount was disclosed in the
opinion; the verdict amount was not disclosed in two opinions. In states with more than five
cases included, doctors won 100% of the cases in Ohio (8/8), but only 56% in Illinois (5/9).
C. Outcome by Medical Specialty
The outcomes varied between medical specialties. Emergency medicine doctors were at
the highest risk for an adverse outcome winning only 11.1% (1/9) of their PE cases. On the other
end of the spectrum, OB/Gyn doctors and medical subspecialists (cardiology, pulmonology and
neurology) were least likely to lose prevailing 90% of the time. In between the extremes,

Ellen Platt, Unpublished versus Unreported: What’s the Difference (1996),
https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/perspec/1996-fall/1996-fall-8.pdf.
9
2016 dollars were calculated at: CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=5154000&year1=2005&year2=2016 (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
8
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surgical specialists (general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, cardiothoracic surgeons, and
obstetrician/gynecologists) won 78.9% (26/33), and primary care physicians (family practice and
internal medicine doctors) won 65.2% (15/23). If emergency medicine doctors’ cases are
eliminated from the study, doctors overall won 77.4% (48/62).
D. Outcome Based Upon Diagnostic Error
Doctors won 100% (7/7 cases) of cases when the PE was diagnosed immediately upon
presentation of the patient. Doctors won 92% (23/25) of cases where the patient first presented
with sudden death. In contrast, doctors only won 48.4% (15/31) of cases where the PE was
initially misdiagnosed. When the doctor misdiagnosed the PE as pneumonia, the plaintiff had a
50% (3/6) chance of winning. The largest verdict, $20,241,695, involved a case where the
patient died of PE when the treatment (heparin) of the known PE was stopped by a young doctorin-training (intern) to get a radiographic study (angiogram) with the supervising doctors denying
at trial giving the intern permission to order the stoppage.10 When this single case is removed
from the study, the mean jury award drops to $1,522,621 for the remaining 70 cases.
The second largest award, $6,350,715, was in a case where the PE was misdiagnosed for
75 days before the patient finally succumbed. In two cases, the doctor misdiagnosed the PE as
hyperventilation and recommended a brown paper bag as treatment resulting jury verdicts for the
plaintiff in both cases with an average award for the plaintiff of $2,623,072.11
E. Outcome Based Upon the Patient’s Presenting Symptoms
When the patient did not initially complain of the most common symptoms associated
with PE (shortness of breath, chest pain, hemoptysis, and/or cough), the doctor prevailed 83.9%

10

Spyrka v. Cnty. of Cook, 851 N.E.2d 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
Schiles v. Schaefer, 710 S.W.2d 254, 258, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Arkin v. Gittleson, 32
F.3d 658, 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1994).
11
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(26/31) of the time. Doctors won 92% (23/25) of cases where the patient first presented with
sudden death without warning. In contrast, when the patient presented with primarily shortness
of breath (“SOB”), doctors won only 47.1% (8/17). When the SOB was combined with other
symptoms, the doctor won 83.3% (10/12). When chest pain alone was present, doctors won 80%
(4/5) and won even more often, 92.3%, when chest pain was combined with other symptoms.
IV. Discussion
A. EMERGENCY MEDICINE DOCTORS ARE UNIQUELY VULNERABLE TO
PLAINTIFF JURY VERDICTS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS RELATED
TO PULMONARY EMBOLUS.
Emergency medicine (EM) specialty physicians are particularly vulnerable to adverse
jury verdicts in PE-related medical malpractice cases. In this study, the EM doctor prevailed
only 11% (1/9) of the time whereas all other specialties combined won 77% (48/62) of their
cases (P < 0.05). The literature suggests that doctors generally win 79.6% of medical
malpractice cases that go to trial,12 which is similar to the win rate of the combined population of
doctors in this study minus the EM doctors.
Emergency medicine doctors seem to be held to higher standards than other doctors
because EM doctors who misdiagnose the patient also lose much more frequently than other
doctors who misdiagnose. When other types of doctors initially misdiagnose the patient’s PE as
something else, the doctors still win the case 61% (14/23) of the time. In contrast, EM doctors
only win 12.5% (1/8) of cases where misdiagnosis occurred. In one case,13 the EM doctor lost
even though the patient coded (lost heart rate and blood pressure) within 2.25 hours of

12

A.B. Jenna, et al., Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against US Physicians,
172(11) ARCH. INTERN. MED. 892, 893 (2012).
13
Vigil v. Montero, No. 08-01-00092-CV, 2002 WL 1988173 (Tex. App. 2002).
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presentation making causation questionable since the average time to diagnosis was 2.4 hours at
the Mayo Clinic in one study and since treatment prior to diagnosis can be dangerous in some
situations.14 Some guidelines recommend starting treatment prior to diagnosis when the clinical
suspicion of PE is high,15 but some doctors believe that this may not be the most prudent course
in spite of the guidelines.16
Juries seem to be expecting more from EM doctors perhaps believing the patient has
presented with symptoms that the patient believed (correctly here) were “emergent,” but the EM
doctor arguably failed to recognize the emergency (“arguably” because sometimes the EM
doctor admitted the patient with another urgent diagnosis like pneumonia). It is easy for a
layperson to imagine the distress he or she would feel if he/she or a loved one went to the
emergency room in distress and expected proper treatment, but the EM doctor failed to make the
diagnosis resulting in death or severe complication. However, is this really a fair and just
outcome?

14

Smith, supra note 2, at 1384. See also, A.J. Burge et al., Increased diagnosis of pulmonary
embolism without a corresponding decline in mortality during the CT era, 63(4) CLIN. RADIOL.
381 (2008); P. Egermayer, Value of anticoagulants in the treatment of pulmonary embolism: a
discussion paper, 74(9) J. R. SOC. MED. 675 (1981); P. Egermayer & G. Town, The clinical
significance of pulmonary embolism: uncertainties and implications for treatment—a debate,
241(1) J. INTERN. MED. 5 (1997); P. Egermayer & G. Town, The mortality of untreated
pulmonary embolism in patients with intermediate probability lung scans, 114 (5) CHEST 1487
(1998); D. Cundiff, Does anticoagulant treatment reduce the mortality of acute pulmonary
embolism?, 161(17) ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2148 (2001).
15
Smith, supra note 2, at 1383 (citing Torbicki, supra note 1; D. Charlebois et al., Early
recognition of pulmonary embolism: the key to lowering mortality, 20(4) J. CARDIOVASC. NURS.
254 (2005); American College of Chest Physicians, Anti-thrombotic therapy for venous
thromboembolic disease: American College of Chest Physicians Evidence-Based Clinical
Practice Guidelines (8th Edition), 133(6) CHEST 454S (2008).)
16
Id.
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Causation is likely where the heart of these cases lies. Did the EM doctor’s failure to
diagnose actually and proximately cause the death/complication? Early administration of
heparin reduces the risk of death associated with PE.17 Diagnosis of PE in the emergency
department reduces the risk of death (mortality) compared to those diagnosed later.18 However,
PE is not fatal in 95% of ambulatory patients…even when misdiagnosed.19 So, did the EM
doctor really “cause” the death or was the missed diagnosis more of a “loss-of-chance”?
The plaintiff’s best argument is probably that the EM doctor’s failure to diagnose
increased the risk of in-hospital death almost five-fold (from 1.4% if diagnosed in the ED to
6.7% if diagnosed later) and risk of death within 30 days over three-fold (from 4.4% to 15.3%).20
Using this logic, the plaintiff can argue that the patient was three to five times more likely to die
(depending upon the timing of death) due to the EM doctor’s missed opportunity than if the EM
doctor had made the diagnosis. This may be enough to convince juries beyond the
preponderance of the evidence standard.
On the other hand, the defense can argue that the doctor’s misdiagnosis only reduced the
patient’s odds of survival during hospitalization by 5.5% (6.7 minus 1.4) and during the
following 30 days by 9.9% (15.3 minus 4.4), which is more in line with a “loss of chance” than
actual causation.21 In addition to the doctor’s misdiagnosis, other factors may play a role in

17

See Smith, supra note 2, at 1382; see also D.W. Barritt and S.C. Jordan, Anticoagulant drugs
in the treatment of pulmonary embolism: A controlled trial, 1(7138) LANCET 1309 (1960).
18
See Smith, supra note 2, at 1383; see also J.A. Kline et al., Prospective study of the clinical
features and outcomes of emergency department patients with delayed diagnosis of pulmonary
embolism, 14(7) ACAD. EMERG. MED. 592 (2007).
19
K. Calder et al., The Mortality of Untreated Pulmonary Embolism in Emergency Department
Patients, 45 ANNALS EMERG. MED. 302 (2005).
20
Smith, supra note 2.
21
Id.
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mortality including a history of cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), and
older age.22 Some studies have also suggested that cardiovascular disease and hemodynamic
instability are predictive of mortality.23 In addition, some authors argue that PE is overdiagnosed and over-treated with adverse results related to overtreatment.24 Thus, the defense
may be able to successfully argue that the plaintiff has not met its burden regarding actual
causation since the patient’s other diseases and simple probability may have contributed to the
outcome and the doctor may have been justified in hesitating in coming up with the diagnosis.
Interestingly, juries from two different states (IL, OH) with similar negligence
standards—modified comparative fault—have markedly different results in the small number of
PE cases available for comparison. In Ohio, doctors won 100% (8/8) of the cases, whereas in
Illinois, doctors only won 55.6% (5/9). The laws in both states appear to be similar and
interpreted similarly by the insurance industry.25 There are likely other factors at play here. In
2016, Illinois annually pays out $20.08 per capita ($258,191,000 total) in medical malpractice
claims compared to $7.65 per capita ($88,787,000 total) in Ohio.26 Therefore, the differences in

22

Id. at 1388.
See S.Z. Goldhaber et al., Acute pulmonary embolism: clinical outcomes in the International
Cooperative Pulmonary Embolism Registry (ICOPER), 353(9162) LANCET 1386 (1999); see also
J.L. Carson et al., Pulmonary embolism and mortality in patients with COPD, 110(5) CHEST
1212 (1996); J.L. Carson et al., The clinical course of pulmonary embolism. 326(19) N. ENGL. J.
MED. 1240 (1992); J. Wicki et al., Predicting adverse outcome in patients with acute pulmonary
embolism: a risk score, 84(4) THROMB. HAEMOST. 548 (2000).
24
See supra note 14.
25
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (2006); see also,
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Comparative negligence,
https://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Newsroom/Tips/Documents/comparativenegligence.pdf;
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Comparative negligence,
http://insurance.illinois.gov/autoinsurance/comp_Negl.asp.
26
J. Gower, 2016 Medical Malpractice Payout Analysis, DIEDERICH HEALTHCARE (April 18,
2016), http://www.diederichhealthcare.com/the-standard/2016-medical-malpractice-payoutanalysis/.
23
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outcomes between the two states’ PE cases are likely due to differing ways of thinking about
malpractice cases among jurors from the different states, and not due to differences in these two
states’ laws.
B. PERCEIVED SIMPLICITY OF DIAGNOSIS AND PRESENCE OF EMOTIONAL
FACTORS LIKELY PLAY A ROLE IN PLAINTIFF JURY VERDICTS.
When the doctor doesn’t have a chance to make the diagnosis (i.e., the patient just dies
suddenly), the doctor almost always prevails. When the doctor faces a tough diagnostic
dilemma, the doctor almost always prevails. However, when the diagnostic challenge appears
simple—e.g., the patient only has symptoms related to lung problems—the doctor loses more
often than not. Inflammatory, emotional factors—such as finger pointing by supervising doctors,
failing to make the diagnosis for a prolonged period of time, or use of arguably dismissive
treatments like breathing in a brown paper bag—lead to significantly higher jury awards.
Prior studies have shown that up to 95% of patients who die from PE do so before the
diagnosis is made, so the majority of deaths from PE occur in untreated patients.27 Likewise, in
this study, the patient often (25/71 cases; 35.2%) simply suddenly died before an opportunity
was present for the doctor to make the diagnosis—even though in some cases the doctor may
have had an opportunity to arguably prevent the PE with prophylaxis. Specifically, juries
favored doctors in 92% (23/25) of cases where the patient presented with sudden death. This
was true even though risk factors were present for PE that may have gone unrecognized by the
doctor in prior interactions with the patient such as recent high risk surgical procedure,
symptoms of blood clot in the leg, or prior history of blood clots. In fact, prophylaxis to prevent
PE was virtually never mentioned in any of the cases as a part of the allegation of malpractice

27

Smith, supra note 2, 1382; see also, Torbicki, supra note 1; Goldhaber, supra note 23; Calder,
supra note 19.
9

reported in the opinions. Because prophylaxis is often controversial and almost all doctors
arguably use some type of prophylaxis—which may include prescription medications, early
mobilization, ted hose, aspirin, calf pumps, etc.—it is not surprising that the courts largely
ignored the issue when it came time for a decision.
The diagnostic challenge presented to the doctor appears to play a role in jury verdicts for
PE cases. Doctors are more likely to lose when the presenting symptoms appeared to pose less
of a diagnostic challenge. When the patient presented with a primary symptom of shortness of
breath alone, plaintiffs prevailed in 53% (9/17) of cases. In contrast, when other symptoms
accompanied the shortness of breath, the doctor won 83.3% of the cases (10/12). One study
suggests that patients with more co-morbid conditions do indeed prove to be more of a
diagnostic challenge for physicians because PE symptoms can be mistaken for coronary artery
disease, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or other conditions.28
Here, the findings seem to indicate that the jury sees shortness of breath in isolation as a more
simple sign of PE and is therefore less understanding when the physician fails to make the
diagnosis and save the patient. On the other hand, when shortness of breath is combined with
other symptoms that may mislead the physician to make an erroneous diagnosis or result in a
complication or death of the patient, the jury is more likely to be forgiving of the doctor.
In addition, emotional factors may play a role in the size of jury awards. PE cases are
generally more emotional than the average medical malpractice case. In this study, 93% (66/71)
of the cases involved death of the patient, whereas only 22% of medical malpractice cases

28

Smith, supra note 2, at 1387.
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generally involve death.29 In the case with the largest award, a doctor-in-training stopped the
patient’s medication and all of the attending doctors supervising the young doctor denied
authorizing the stoppage.30 The lack of supervision or the failure to take responsibility may have
inflamed the jury. Similarly, in one case, the patient was misdiagnosed for 75 days, and the jury
awarded $6,350,715.31 In two cases, the doctor misdiagnosed the pulmonary embolism as
hyperventilation and had the patient breathe into a brown paper bag as treatment.32 The thought
of a patient dying of PE being treated with such a seemingly dismissive treatment may have
inflamed the jury resulting in an average award over two and a half times the median plaintiff
award ($2,623,072 average for the paper bag cases versus $1,048,114 median).
C. WHEN THE DIAGNOSIS IS MADE IMMEDIATELY, THE DOCTOR WINS—BUT
MISDIAGNOSIS LEADS TO FREQUENT PLAINTIFF VERDICTS.
Initial diagnosis is a key factor in the outcomes of jury trials for PE. When the doctor
made the diagnosis immediately, the defense prevailed 100% of the time (7/7 cases). This is true
even though treatment was delayed in some patients due to contraindications or other clinical
concerns. In contrast, when the doctor misdiagnosed the patient or failed to make the diagnosis,
the doctor lost 51.6% of the cases (16/31). The fact that doctors won 48.4% (15/31 cases) of
misdiagnosis cases likely is related to the fact that the diagnosis can be difficult to make when
the patient has multiple comorbidities or confusing symptoms33—thus, misdiagnosis is not

29

C. Lee and R. LaFountain, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, 6 (April 2011),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/microsites/files/csp/highlights/18_1_medical_malpractice
_in_state_courts.ashx.
30
Spyrka, supra note 10, at 804.
31
Welch v. McLean, 191 S.W.3d 147, 153, 156 (Tex. App. 2005) (verdict amount converted to
2016 dollars as noted supra in footnote 9).
32
Supra note 11.
33
Smith, supra note 2.
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necessarily outside the standard of care depending upon the symptoms present, tests ordered, and
timing.
D. THIS STUDY LIKELY ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE OUTCOMES OF
PULMONARY EMBOLISM CASES THAT GO TO JURY TRIAL.
The source of the data—judicial opinions—likely accurately reflects the courts’ and
juries’ perceptions, even though it may not accurately reflect the medical record or facts. In
some cases, the facts reported are medically inaccurate—e.g., the judge reported that one expert
testified that heparin actually dissolves blood clots like PEs (i.e., it is thrombolytic)34 although
heparin only prevents clot propagation and does not dissolve the clot.35 Whether the judge
misheard or the expert was mistaken, the medical facts considered in the outcome were probably
inaccurate.
In addition, it is very likely that judges overlook or fail to mention important clinical
symptoms and may misstate precise timelines in the judicial opinions. However, the judicial
opinion reflects what the judge took away from the expert testimony and medical record.
Whether accurate or not, the facts presented in the opinion are the ones that the jury likely relied
upon in making its decision. Therefore, this type of study may be a more accurate guide to jury
verdicts than one in which an accurate medical record review is included. Given HIPAA, access,
and expense issues, accurate medical record review in this type of study would be difficult, cost
preclusive, and nearly impossible due to privacy issues.

34

Perez v. Bakel, 862 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
T.M. Hyers et al., Antithrombotic therapy for venous thromboembolic disease, 119(1 suppl)
CHEST 176S (2001); B. Furie, Mechanisms of thrombus formation, 359(9) N. ENGL. J. MED. 938
(2008).
35
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The limited medical information in the judicial opinions was inadequate for the author to
meet his goal of evaluating jury outcomes where prophylaxis may have been indicated. An
attempt was made to assign Caprini risk values36 for PE to each patient, but the opinions were
simply devoid of enough clinical information to make reliable assessments. Therefore, no
conclusions were reached regarding the potential jury outcomes where the doctor failed to
properly prophylactically treat the patient after a high risk procedure or where the patient had
known risk factors for PE—except that the lack of judicial attention to this issue may be in line
with the controversy that surrounds venous thromboembolic prophylaxis in general.
Even though these are mostly reported cases, the data still likely accurately reflect
general PE jury outcomes since the reasons these cases were in the reporters are likely more
related to legal issues than the underlying medical facts. The fact that the 79% of the cases in
this study (57/71) were published in a reporter may add some biases to the outcomes when
compared to the average PE case since most PE cases are not published in reporters. Cases
published in a reporter tend to be “of interest,” establish new law, criticize or question existing
law, reverse a judgment, respond to a remand, or perhaps add other legal biases to the case
selection.37 However, the decision to include a case in a reporter is likely more related to
underlying issues of law, instead of the medical issues that are largely examined in this study.
Still, in this study, doctors won 65% (37/57) of reported cases versus 85.7% (12/14) of
unreported cases. Thus, if there is a bias here, favorable plaintiff verdicts may be overestimated.
V. Conclusion

36

J.A. Caprini, Thrombosis risk assessment as a guide to quality patient care, 51 DISEASE-AMONTH 70 (2005).
37
Platt, supra note 8.
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Pulmonary embolism often presents a difficult diagnostic challenge for doctors and juries
alike. Juries hold emergency medicine doctors to higher standards than other doctors in
management of acute PE such that EM doctors are uniquely vulnerable in PE medical
malpractice claims. Juries are more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when the presenting
symptoms appear to more simply point to the diagnosis of PE and when emotional factors are in
play. When the diagnosis of PE is made by the doctor immediately, the plaintiff is unlikely to
prevail regardless of outcome. However, if the doctor initially misdiagnoses the PE, the plaintiff
is more likely to win than lose. Doctors facing more difficult diagnostic challenges are often
favored by juries, even when they make a diagnostic mistake. While this study is not perfect, it
likely accurately reflects how juries assess pulmonary embolism medical malpractice claims.
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APPENDIX B1: DATASHEET FOR CASE COLLECTION (SURGICAL CASES)
GRIFFIN: Pulmonary Embolism Study: Surgical Case Data Sheet
Case Name:
State Law Applied:
Complication (Death, MI, PE alone, etc.):

Date:
Plaintiff (Patient, estate, widow, etc.):

(1) Medical Specialty & Type of Surgical Procedure:
(2) Specialty of Physician Sued:
(3) Additional Risk Factors of Patient Mentioned in Opinion:
(4) Estimated Risk Class of Surgical Procedure/Patient (circle one)
HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

(5) Type of Prophylaxis Rendered
NONE

MECHANICAL:

CHEMICAL:

OTHER:

CONTRAINDICATIONS?

(6) Time from Procedure until PE:
(7) Primary Symptom upon Presentation with PE (circle all that apply):
SHORTNESS OF BREATH

CHEST PAIN

COUGH HEMOPTYSIS

OTHER:
(8) Timeliness of PE Diagnosis (days after presentation):
(9) Outcome of Trial By Jury (circle prevailing party):
PLAINTIFF

DOCTOR

(10) Monetary Award Amount:
AMOUNT:

NOT APPLICABLE

(11) Court of Appeals’ Result:
AFFIRMED

REVERSED

REVERSED & REMANDED

OTHER:
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APPENDIX B2: DATASHEET FOR CASE COLLECTION (NON-SURGICAL CASES)
GRIFFIN: Pulmonary Embolism Study: NON-Surgical Case Data Sheet
Case Name:
State Law Applied:
Complication (Death, MI, PE alone, etc.):

Date:
Plaintiff (Patient, estate, widow, etc.):

(1) Specialty of Physician Sued:
(2) Additional Risk Factors of Patient Mentioned in Opinion:
(3) Primary Symptom upon Presentation with PE (circle all that apply):
SHORTNESS OF BREATH

CHEST PAIN

COUGH HEMOPTYSIS

OTHER:
(4) Timeliness of PE Diagnosis (days after presentation):
(5) Outcome of Trial By Jury (circle prevailing party):
PLAINTIFF

DOCTOR

(6) Monetary Award Amount:
AMOUNT:

NOT APPLICABLE

(7) Court of Appeals’ Result:
AFFIRMED

REVERSED

REVERSED & REMANDED

OTHER:
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